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Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and
the Two Koreas
Mel Gurtov
Abstract: This commentary assesses the
geopolitical implications for war and peace in
Northeast Asia of the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense antimissile system that the US
seeks to install in South Korea at a time of deep
tensions in Northeast Asia.

a new source of tension in already fraught SinoUS relations.
Most of these negatives could have been
anticipated when THAAD was initially on the
drawing board several years ago. Yet they were
thrust into the background on the argument
that the North Korean missile threat to the
continental US was so pressing as to warrant
building a defense against it. Never mind that
Kim Jong-un and his colleagues would have to
contemplate that a missile attack on South
Korea, Japan, or the United States would result
in a counterattack and the immediate and utter
destruction of North Korea’s military and
political institutions. But US leaders in the last
two administrations have preferred to press
ahead with missile defense rather than (a)
consider the possibility that North Korea’s
nuclear weapon and missile buildup is intended
to deter a US attack; (b) weigh a new
diplomatic overture to the North that might
reduce tensions and thus the need for THAAD;
and (c) give North Korea further incentive to
complete work on an ICBM. Lay the US
decision at the door of the “military-industrial
complex” if you will—Lockheed Martin is the
manufacturer, and a single THAAD unit costs
about $1.6 billion 1 —the fact remains that
planning and deployment of THAAD is a
decision where the risks and costs far outweigh
any benefit.

THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,
Lockheed Martin, “We’re engineering a better
tomorrow”

The US decision, supported by the South
Korean government, to deploy an antimissile
system known as THAAD (Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense) may be one of the most
thoughtless strategic moves in a generation.
The official US justification is that close-in
defense against North Korean missiles is
necessary to protect South Korea. But the
deployment is having more than a few negative
repercussions: an argument in China for
increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile; an
incentive in North Korea for continuing to
develop its long-range missile capability; a
deep fissure in China-South Korea relations; a
roiling of South Korean politics at a time when
its corrupt president has been impeached; and

And those (supposed) benefits are already
shrinking. North Korea now has a formidable
array of short- and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs), and seems close to deploying
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Its
latest test, in which four IRBMs were launched
1
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because of its radar warning system, which
may reduce if not neutralize China’s ability to
respond immediately to an external attack.
Beijing has never been persuaded by US
arguments that THAAD is solely directed at
North Korean missiles. Since China sees
THAAD as actually directed at it, Beijing may
well respond by expanding its arsenal of
nuclear-tipped missiles. Launch-on-warning
might also become an attractive option for
China, a course that would greatly increase the
risk of nuclear war.

into the Sea of Japan, may be just the beginning
of a new round of missile testing as the North
evidently seeks the ability to overwhelm
THAAD and pose a credible threat to
neighboring countries and in theory to the US
west coast. THAAD may be an improvement
over other antiballistic missile (ABM) systems,
and it has reportedly passed more tests than it
has failed. But time and again it has been
shown that ABMs cannot shoot down every
missile, which is presumably armed with
decoys and penetration aids. And THAAD,
according to one expert, is “useless” against an
ICBM. 2 The Japanese, who already have an
ABM system (PAC-3), can’t feel all that much
more secure because of THAAD.

Another cost of THAAD deployment is the
sudden end of the China-South Korea
honeymoon. Until recently China was on a roll
with South Korea in everything from trade and
investment to tourism, entertainment, and
3
educational exchange. The two countries were
officially described as having a “matured
strategic cooperative partnership,” reflected in
much more frequent high-level contact between
Beijing and Seoul than between Beijing and
Pyongyang. THAAD has placed South Korea on
China’s enemy list: South Korean goods and
entertainers are being boycotted, and some
Chinese sources are calling for direct political
and even military action against South Korea.
This rupture bodes ill for Chinese cooperation
on UN-authorized sanctions against North
Korea as well as for Chinese aspirations to
become as important to South Korea as the
Americans have traditionally been.4

Though Kim Jong-un and his generals surely
are not suicidal, the new and inexperienced US
ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley,
has just described Kim as “not rational.” Most
observers of North Korea over the years have
considered its strategic thinking every bit
rational given its history of seven decades of
rule, much of it under attack and/or blockade
by the United States, its coalition allies, and
South Korea. The view of North Korean leaders
has always been that their security is under
threat and that nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles are their best means of defense from
threats—from deployment of THAAD to wipe
out the North’s missile advantage, from the
annual large-scale joint US-South Korean
exercise known as Foal Eagle that is now
underway, from US air and naval power
arrayed throughout East Asia, and from nuclear
threats such as the “kinetic options” that Haley
referenced. Pyongyang will most likely forge
ahead with nuclear and missile development so
long as the United States offers no incentives
that might incline Kim Jong-un to choose a
different route to security.

Deployment of THAAD could not have come at
a worse time for South Korea. A constitutional
court has just ruled unanimously that President
Park Geun-hye must step down in the wake of
corruption charges. A new election will be held
within 60 days. By then THAAD may be fully
deployed as the US rushes to make the system
a fait accompli for the next South Korean
president. If Moon Jae-in, currently the front
runner and an admirer of Kim Dae-jung’s
Sunshine policy, is elected, he will face a very
difficult decision—whether to insist that
THAAD not be made operational and risk

Meanwhile, the Chinese, who have railed
against THAAD for years, now may make their
own countermove. Their argument is that
THAAD threatens China’s strategic situation
2
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time. Instead, “I can tell you we’re not ruling
out anything, and we’re considering every
6
option,” Haley said. So who is not being
rational?

angering Washington, or allow it to become
operational and anger China and North Korea.

Constantly talking up the North Korean threat
and using it to justify ever more sophisticated
and expensive antimissile technologies to
defend against it is foolish and self-defeating.
Diplomacy with North Korea is much more
cost-effective. If Washington were in more
experienced hands, it would indefinitely delay
full deployment of THAAD or, if requested by a
new South Korean president, decide not to
operationalize it. Secretary Tillerson might, as
a result of discussions with ROK leaders,
announce on his current trip that future USROK exercises would depend on the security
situation on the peninsula—a half-step toward
Wang Yi’s proposal.

A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
interceptor being fired during an exercise in
2013, U.S. Department of Defense

Finally, THAAD adds to the mix of policy
differences between China and the US. The
Trump administration has thus far shown little
interest in, and knowledge of East Asian affairs.
The president has no legitimate Asia expertise
to rely on, and has already made some serious
missteps on China. The last thing Trump needs
as he deals with “Russiagate” and numerous
domestic challenges is a major dispute with
China and an ever-enlarging strategic problem
with North Korea. THAAD worsens his options.
Whether Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who
is about to visit South Korea and China, will
come to that conclusion is open to doubt. He
too has limited experience in Asia and so far
has been invisible in US policymaking.

These moves would not resolve the nuclear
issue with North Korea or turn around
contentious relations with China. But sidelining
THAAD would reassure China—it might even
provide a bargaining chip to freeze Chinese
weapons deployments in the South China Sea.
It would certainly remove a volatile issue from
South Korean politics at a time of a national
leadership crisis. If a new decision on THAAD
were accompanied by revival of talks with
North Korea, which a Moon Jae-in
administration in Seoul is likely to initiate and
which the Trump administration should
support, it might put a brake on the drift
toward confrontation. Unless the Trump
administration starts paying attention to
THAAD’s liabilities, it will face a cold-war style
crisis at the same time that the United States
and Europe are in the midst of another cold
war standoff with Russia over Ukraine.

China’s foreign minister Wang Yi has made an
interesting proposal: “double suspension” to
put a brake on the escalating situation. His idea
is that the US and ROK would suspend their
joint exercises in return for North Korea’s
suspension of nuclear and missile tests, and all
sides would return to the negotiating table.
“Are both sides prepared for a head-on
collision?” he asked.5 Evidently one of them is;
Nikki Haley, joined by her Korean counterpart,
dismissed Wang’s idea as not being at the right

The multiple security issues in Northeast Asia
are precisely why a regional multilateral
security dialogue mechanism is essential, such
7
as I’ve suggested in these pages. It would
provide a venue for addressing common3
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peninsula. A dialogue mechanism can breathe
new life into those talks, affording the
opportunity to debate rather than fire away and
consider small steps to defuse tensions. Absent
such a mechanism, we can expect that the
North Koreans will proceed with nuclear and
missile development, China’s appeals to both
North and South Korea will fall on deaf ears,
and the US-ROK-Japan alliance will plot ways to
pressure North Korea even more intensely
rather than restart a dialogue with it. 8 The
consequences can be explosive.
Related articles

security issues such as climate change, public
health and economic development in North
Korea, sustainable energy, and a peace treaty
ending the Korean War guaranteed by the
major powers. To be sure, nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles are worrisome not only for the
United States, the two Koreas, and China but
for all nations in the region: China has a
legitimate concern about having its nuclear
deterrent compromised by THAAD, and the
United States certainly wants strategic stability
with China. The United States has a legitimate
desire to defend against North Korean missiles
that can reach Japanese and South Korean
targets and one day soon the US west coast.
But North Korea has an equally legitimate
objective to strengthen its deterrent in the face
of US, Korean, Japanese, and now Chinese
pressures. And so it goes. Arguing about
“defensive” and “offensive” weapons is likely to
be a non-starter, however, unless some degree
of mutual trust can be achieved first. North
Korea’s arsenal of perhaps twenty nuclear
weapons and its formidable missile capability
present a much different challenge from a
decade ago.

Peter Hayes, Continuation of Policy By
Other Means: Ensuring that US-ROK
Military Exercises Don’t Increase Risk of
War (http://apjjf.org/2017/06/Hayes.html)
Tim Beal, The Korean Peninsula within
the Framework of US Global Hegemony
(http://apjjf.org/2016/22/Beal.html)
Mel Gurtov, Sanctions and Defiance in
North
Korea
(http://apjjf.org/2016/09/Gurtov.html)
Peter Hayes, Ending a Nuclear Threat via
a Northwest Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free
Zone
(http://apjjf.org/2015/13/3/Peter-Hayes/4
253.html)
Mel Gurtov, Time for the U.S. to Engage
North
Korea
(http://apjjf.org/2014/11/33/Mel-Gurtov/4
166/article.html)

Previous regional diplomacy in Northeast Asia
has produced results worth building on. The Six
Party Talks in 2005 and 2007 created a
reasonable menu of “action-for-action” steps,
including economic and energy cooperation
and normalization of diplomatic relations as
well as denuclearization of the Korean
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